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Abstract: Community forest management (CFM) is considered an alternative way to 
protect forests while providing income for smallholders. Since the mid-1990s, the number 
of CFM projects has rapidly increased in the Brazilian Amazon, although most of them still 
face several difficulties. In this paper, we discuss the obstacles to the financial viability of 
CFM in this region and propose some ways to overcome them. Based on evidence from 
five case studies, we assess the extent to which sustainable forest management for 
commercial timber production contributes to smallholder income. We show that harvesting 
timber only provides a limited cash income to smallholders, even though forest covers 80% 
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of their landholding. Market access to timber is very uncertain and smallholder 
communities often fail to make a profit from their timber. Minimum remunerative public 
prices and support for timber marketing are thus needed. Simpler and more flexible 
procedures are required to reduce the high transaction costs of obtaining a permit and 
increase smallholder involvement in legal forest management for commercial purposes. 
Finally, a better assessment of timber potential in smallholder forest reserves through 
systematic inventories would be useful to avoid arousing false expectations. 
Keywords: Brazilian Amazon; community forest management; tropical timber 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the mid-1990s, attempts to implement sustainable community forest management  
(CFM)—defined here as collective forest management involving several households or communities 
that is undertaken for commercial purposes—have increased worldwide, in part due to the efforts of 
international donors and environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Several authors have 
explored some of the conditions that enable or prevent successful outcomes for CFM projects [1–11].  
In Central America, particularly in Mexico and Guatemala, many success stories have been  
reported [2,8,11,12]. However, even in these countries, ongoing initiatives are still facing many 
difficulties. The main challenges are related to organizational capacity and access to markets. CFM 
projects are also affected by regulatory frameworks that in many countries are to their disadvantage 
and greatly reduce their potential profitability. In Africa and Asia, the proportion of household income 
derived from CFM is low [13], often too low to have an impact on household assets [14]. 
In the Brazilian Amazon, according to the Forest Code, until 2012, 50% to 80% of all landholdings 
had to be conserved as forest, where only sustainable management of timber and non-timber forest 
products is allowed. According to official data, at least 40 million hectares of forests are held by 
smallholders and communities and could potentially be managed through sustainable forest 
management (SFM) [15]. In some states, the existing demand for timber may only be met in the future 
with an expansion of CFM or small-scale SFM [16]. 
Public incentives to promote CFM in Brazil started in the mid-1990s with the Promanejo Program 
(support for sustainable forest management in the Amazon), as a component of the “pilot program to 
conserve the Brazilian rainforest” (PPG7), which supported several so-called “promissory initiatives.” 
The creation of new settlement models, such as “extractive reserves” (Portuguese acronym RESEX), 
agro-extractive settlements (Portuguese acronym PAE), or sustainable development settlements 
(Portuguese acronym PDS), in regions that still have large continuously forested areas has clarified 
land and resources rights for the communities. The Brazilian forestry law was reformed in 1998 and 
again in 2006 to create and subsequently to simplify the legal framework regulating CFM [8]. More 
recently, the legal framework was again reformed to reinforce the fight against illegal schemes 
involving smallholders with CFM. Since 2010, communities are no longer allowed to subcontract 
logging operations to a timber company unless they can prove that they themselves do not have 
sufficient labor to do the work. Moreover, the Normative Instruction No. 5 from the Ministry of 
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Agrarian Reform and Normative Instruction No. 16 from the Ministry of Environment introduced new 
institutions for the assessment and approval of CFM plans. The National Land Reform Institute 
(Portuguese acronym INCRA) for CFM in agrarian settlements, and the Chico Mendes Institute 
(Portuguese acronym ICMBio) for CFM in conservation units, must not only approve the plan of 
operation before it is submitted to the environmental authorities but also their annual management plan. 
Currently, smallholders in the Amazon still tend to sell timber to loggers and intermediaries both 
legally, often by acquiring authorization aimed at converting forest to croplands, and illegally, which 
likely accounts for the largest proportion, to obtain immediate cash [17,18]. According to the most 
recent official data, 127 timber CFM projects were submitted to environmental public agencies in the 
Amazon in 2010, 48 in Pará, 36 in Amazonas, 23 in Acre, 16 in Rondônia, and 4 in Amapa. However, 
most were not approved and only 53 plans were implemented in 2010 [19]. Public or/and private 
financial support has been provided for the submission of these CFM projects. In the states of Acre and 
Amazonas, the drafting and submission of CFM plans have been financially supported by public and 
NGO funds, including the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) and the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN). In the state of Pará, many CFM plans in agricultural settlements have 
been submitted through partnerships between communities and private timber companies [20]. 
Brazilian CFM projects still face many obstacles. In addition to the financial requirements, the long 
bureaucratic process required to obtain the necessary legal documents is a barrier for many 
communities [8,21]. Undertaking forestry operations is costly. Until 2010, any community could 
decide whether to harvest timber on its own or to contract a timber company. Both schemes have 
advantages and disadvantages. The building and maintenance of physical infrastructure are usually 
very costly for communities. Forming a partnership with a timber company helps overcome these 
difficulties but may reduce the economic return for the community. Without subsidies, few plans cover 
the operational costs with ease and communities barely succeed in becoming self-sufficient, i.e., 
independent of the support of an external agent [21,22]. Moreover, technologies that comply with legal 
requirements are often very costly and are not always successful [18,23]. 
Like in other countries, one of the main challenges in Brazil is to increase the competitiveness and 
attractiveness of SFM compared with other land uses [24,25]. Understanding monetary costs and 
benefits thus plays a central role in developing equitable benefit sharing arrangements and assessing 
whether the net gains from timber harvesting under CFM are sufficient to encourage a community’s 
long-term commitment to SFM for commercial purposes. To date, few studies have focused on 
assessing this specific issue. Based on data collected in 2005 and 2006 in four Brazilian CFM plans, 
Medina et al. [22] concluded that none of the case studies they analyzed enabled the communities to 
derive sound benefits from their forests. More recently, a financial analysis of three CFM projects 
demonstrated that their financial viability was fragile, and that they needed subsidies or access to credit 
to cover the fixed costs of salaries [10]. Another recent case study confirmed that potential income 
from multiple use forest management remains modest and lower than potential agricultural incomes on 
a per hectare basis [25]. The main limitations of these studies are that the results were based on a one-year 
assessment and, as pointed out by the authors themselves, costs and benefits can vary greatly from one 
year to another. Neither do the authors detail and extensively discuss the cash income that 
communities can expect from CFM on the major part of their landholdings and how to increase this 
contribution to household income. 
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It is now quite obvious that the financial viability of CFM in this region remains fragile and that 
CFM initiatives often depend on external financial support. We do not question the relevance of such 
subsidies. Rather, our aim is to assess what additional income communities achieved through 
subsidized CFM initiatives and how this contribution could be increased. To this end, we conducted  
a detailed analysis of the annual cost and cash income provided by CFM in the Brazilian Amazon. In 
addition, three of the CFM initiatives presented here were monitored during both the development and 
exploitation stages. This enabled us to broaden our perspective regarding their economic results and 
the obstacles to their financial viability, and to make some suggestions on how they can be overcome. 
We argue that smallholders’ income is not guaranteed by SFM for timber production, even though the 
main part of their landholdings is forested, and that guaranteeing market access at remunerative prices 
for timber from CFM projects is a priority to ensure their financial viability. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Case Studies 
This paper focuses on five CFM initiatives, three located in the state of Pará in the eastern Brazilian 
Amazon and two in the state of Acre in the western Brazilian Amazon (Table 1). Four out of the five 
cases are official smallholder settlement projects and the other is located in a national forest (FLONAS). 
The cases selected represent different forest management models and illustrate the diversity of CFM 
initiatives in the Brazilian Amazon. 








State Acre Pará Acre Pará Pará 
Land tenure Concession Individual Concession Concession Concession in national forest 
Number of households 45 6 12 183 180 
Area (ha) 12,200 364 3100 26,305 32,000 
Area/household involved (ha) 271 61 258 144 178 
Annually harvested area (ha) 500 74 120 500–1000 500–1000 
Logging intensity (m3/ha) 10 15 10 16 12 
CFM: Community forest management. CANOR: the Agro-Extractivist Cooperative of Novos Rumos. 
The oldest projects are found in Acre. The Porto Dias and Chico Mendes Associations were 
pioneers in implementing forest management plans. Their members live in settlement models called 
Projetos de Assentamento Agro-Extrativistas (PAE) (Figure 1). In 2007, they joined a cooperative called 
Cooperfloresta that today manages all CFM projects in Acre. 




Figure 1. Location of the case studies in Acre. 
In Pará, the Agro-Extractivist Cooperative of Novos Rumos (CANOR) is a cooperative of 
smallholders who settled in the municipality of Uruará in the Transamazon region at the beginning of 
the 1970s (Figure 2). These smallholders hold plots that average 100 ha, for which they have 
individual tenure rights, although many have not yet received a formal title. Until 2012, the Brazilian 
Forest Law required that these smallholders maintain 80% of their plots as legal forest reserves. They 
can extract the timber and non-timber forest products from the reserves under an approved forest 
management plan. On the remaining 20% of the land, cattle ranching is the main source of income, but 
farmers also grow corn and rice. 
 
Figure 2. Location of the case studies in Pará. 
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The second case study in Pará is the Virola Jatobá Association initiative. The Virola Jatobá is a 
special category of settlement known as a PDS (sustainable development settlement), located in the 
municipality of Anapu in the Transamazon region (Figure 2). The settlement was created in 2003 and 
covers 37,000 ha [26]. The legal forest reserve is a continuous area that is accessed collectively. The 
remaining area is divided into individual plots each averaging 20 ha, where farmers can raise cattle and 
grow crops. The settlers do not have individual land titles because the association signed a concession 
contract with the government. The contract guarantees long-term user rights over land and forests 
under specific rules. Another distinctive feature is that—with the support of the local Rural Union, the 
Pastoral Land Commission, and NGOs—the association has invested in building a community-company 
partnership. In 2007, it signed a contract with a tropical wood flooring firm, located in Belém, the 
capital of the state. 
The third case study in Pará is located in the Tapajos National Forest, in the Santarem municipality 
(Figure 2). In 2005, a cooperative named Coomflona was created to manage the CFM project. The 
cooperative has 180 members, who are local farmers. The plan received support from the Brazilian 
Forest Service (Portuguese acronym SFB) and international funds from Fond Français pour 
l’Environnement Mondial (FFEM) [27]. Most forestry operations are carried out by members of  
the cooperative. 
2.2. Economic Assessment Methodology 
In Pará, the annual production costs supported by the communities, sales negotiations, and profits 
obtained were monitored in 2007, 2008, and 2009 as part of two research and development projects 
financed by international funds (European Fund and FFEM). In Acre, we used Cooperfloresta financial 
reports including annual costs and gross receipts since 2007, when this cooperative was put in charge 
of the forestry projects. Additional interviews were conducted with association leaders in 2010, 2011, 
and 2015 to enable a qualitative assessment of ongoing projects. 
The annual costs reported are only those that accrue to the communities. The costs paid by 
development projects and public funds are not included because (1) it was not possible to obtain 
reliable data for all the contributions from different sources at the different periods; and (2) in this 
paper, the focus is on estimating costs paid by members of the communities and additional income 
generated by CFM including such external supports—not to question the relevance of such supports. 
Since each plan has its own specificities and has benefited from different types of external support, 
caution should be used when comparing each category of costs. In addition, in two case studies, the 
timber was sold as standing trees and the harvesting costs of the timber company were not included as 
they did not accrue to the community. The detailed production costs are consequently only presented for 
three case studies. Costs are distributed among (1) administrative costs; (2) the pre-harvest stage, which 
includes license fees and procedures, inventory, and opening a road and log landing for the parcel to be 
harvested during the year; (3) the harvesting stage, which includes equipment rentals or depreciation 
and labor costs for logging, skidding, cubage, and technical assistance; and (4) transport costs to the 
mill, again only when these accrue to the community. Certification costs are included when they accrue 
to the community. 
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Information concerning the potential household income derived from each project comes from two 
main sources: (1) the net benefits of timber production (i.e., gross annual benefits from timber sales 
minus the annual production costs paid by the community); and (2) salaries for community members 
involved in administration or forest management operations. The distribution of benefits among the 
community members varies with the scheme. In some cases, e.g., in Virola Jatobá or Chico Mendes, 
the benefits are not distributed but instead are invested in collective goods. However, we decided to 
distribute the net benefits among all the households involved in order to fully discuss the cash income 
a family might expect from a CFM plan. As most of the data were collected in 2008, 2009, and 2010, 
we adjusted the 2008 and 2009 values with the observed IPC (Consumer Price Index) to 2010 (5.9% 
between 2009 and 2010 and 10% between 2008 and 2010) to correct for inflation. For all the 
calculations, the following exchange rate was used: US$1/R$1.72 in 2010. 
3. Results 
3.1. Background and Trajectories of the Case Studies 
According to official data, around 160 families live in the Porto Dias and Chico Mendes settlements 
in Acre. There are two types of families: traditional rubber tappers and formerly landless farmers who 
moved here from different parts of Brazil. The two settlements cover relatively large areas: the Porto 
Dias settlement covers 24,349 ha and the Chico Mendes settlement 24,098 ha. Each family holds about 
300 ha of land, but they do not have private property rights over the land. The whole area belongs to the 
federal government. 
Family incomes depend mainly on rubber tapping and harvesting Brazil nuts. Agriculture is mostly 
for subsistence. Cattle ranching is a secondary source of income. When the CFM initiatives were 
launched in 1996, rubber tappers were suffering from a significant drop in income from Brazil nuts as 
well as a decline in rubber prices that shrunk cash income from forest-based activities. To 
counterbalance the risk of the expansion of cattle ranching, NGOs started to promote and support forest 
timber management inside extractive reserves and PAE. 
The history of CFM in Acre can be divided into two periods: before and after the foundation of 
Cooperfloresta. During the first period (between 2000 and 2006), the forest producers in the Porto Dias 
and Chico Mendes settlements were supported by the Centro dos Trabalhadores da Amazônia (CTA), 
a local NGO, and WWF. They provided support for the preparation of forest management plans and 
for certification. The objective was to prepare community members to perform all forestry activities: 
settlers were trained on subjects ranging from logging to selling processed timber. Subsequently, the 
Porto Dias association purchased an old-fashioned sawmill, whereas the Chico Mendes settlers tried to 
contract out to external sawmills. However, this operational model did not survive. As the settler 
associations had difficulty negotiating their contracts, they joined the group of forest producers of Acre 
(GPFAC), an action sponsored by WWF. The aim of this informal organization was to find buyers and 
act as middlemen in contracts to sell timber from the CFM areas in Acre. In 2006, this informal group 
was dissolved, and a single cooperative (Cooperfloresta) was established to assist existing CFM 
projects in the different stages of forest management. 
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The creation of Cooperfloresta represents a new stage in the development of CFM initiatives in 
Acre. Since 2007, the cooperative has been in charge of planning, monitoring, transporting, sawing, 
and trading all the timber produced by all the CFM projects in the entire state. Nonetheless, the 
production models have changed significantly over time based on decisions made by the associations 
and negotiations with partner timber companies. Until 2008, the community members were still in 
charge of certain forestry activities, such as felling the trees, but other services were already contracted 
out, including transport of the timber. Between 2009 and 2010, both associations decided to 
subcontract timber harvesting and transport to a timber company. After 2010, Cooperfloresta carried 
out logging activities with its own team of members of the communities. Some services requiring 
heavy equipment such as skidders, tractors, and trucks continued to be outsourced. 
In Pará, CANOR was created at the end of the 1990s to implement CFM initially in the legal forest 
reserves of its 42 members. The proposal received financial support from the Promanejo program in 
2004. However, the forest management plan finally submitted in 2006 only involved six members. The 
other members could not participate either because less than 80% of their landholdings were in forest 
reserves, or because their forest reserves were inside a demarcated indigenous reserve. CANOR’s 
members originally intended to saw all the timber harvested themselves; to this end, they purchased a 
portable sawmill with public funds from the Ministry of Agrarian Development (Portuguese acronym 
MDA). For the transport of the sawn wood out of the forest, they decided to combine animal traction 
and tractors. Sawn wood had to be transported to buyers in rented trucks since the original idea was to 
sell all the sawn timber on local and regional markets. 
However, these initial plans had to be revised for several reasons. First, the forest management plan 
was only approved in 2008. From then on, with the technical support of the Floresta and Agricultura 
(FLOAGRI) project [28], they decided to shift to a more prudent scenario and harvest only 15 m3/ha 
instead of 29 m3/ha. They also partially abandoned the idea of selling all the timber as sawn wood; 
only the three most valuable species were to be sawn after a subcontract was negotiated with an 
industrial sawmill. After the first year of logging, the cooperative stopped operating. 
In the case of the Virola-Jatobá CFM, the contract with the tropical wood company was initially 
intended to last 15 years (2008–2023). During this period, the company was supposed to be in charge of all 
production activities and to support all logging costs. The price per cubic meter for each species was 
previously negotiated between the company and the association. The Virola-Jatobá association, with 
the assistance of its sponsors, negotiated other social and economic clauses to enhance the benefits to 
the community. One of the contract clauses stated that the enterprise had to employ some community 
members. The firm had also to maintain the roads within the settlement. Despite these rather positive 
clauses in the contract, after the first year of exploration, the relationship between the community and 
the company progressively deteriorated because the company did not comply with many of the clauses. 
In addition, the company had financial problems and became subordinate to stronger financial partners 
with fewer social and environmental commitments [26]. The company was responsible for several 
management irregularities. The contract was finally cancelled in 2012 following Normative Instruction 
No.5 (see above), and logging stopped until 2014. 
In the case of Coomflona, the forest management for timber production started in 1999 as a project 
supported by the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) aimed at assessing whether 
reduced-impact industrial logging could be profitable. Some communities that were established around 
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this project claimed that they could sustainably manage the forest. In 2001, the Promanejo program 
proposed a CFM plan. Coomflona was created in 2005 and brought together members of different 
communities to implement the CFM plan. The management model was based on the one implemented 
by the former project timber company and benefited from the infrastructure that had already been built 
and from the training that had been provided at that time. From 2010 to 2014, 1000 hectares were cut 
annually. In 2014, the cooperative succeeded in obtaining the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
certification. It also increased logging intensity to reach 24 m3/ hectare in 2014. However, Normative 
Instruction No. 16 from the Ministry of Environment prevented logging in 2015 because ICMBio was 
unable to assess and approve the annual operations plan in time. 
3.2. Production Costs 
Total production costs covered by the communities ranged from US$48/m3 harvested to US$118/m3 
(Table 2). Two main reasons explain the difference. The Porto Dias community subcontracted log 
harvesting and transport to a timber company. The negotiation concerning harvesting was not 
favorable for the community since the company quoted US$53,983 to harvest, or almost US$41/m3, 
whereas the cost was much lower for Coomflona and CANOR. In addition, the technical assistance 
provided by Cooperfloresta during exploitation was included in this harvesting cost as it was paid for 
by the members of the community, whereas in the other two cases technical assistance was financed 
through external funds. For CANOR and Coomflona, skidding was the largest share of the harvesting 
cost. Skidders were rented in both cases and the rental alone amounted to 70% of the skidding costs. 
Table 2. Production costs paid by the communities in Coomflona, Porto Dias, and CANOR. 
Activity 
Coomflona (2008 *) CANOR (2008 *) Porto Dias (2010) 
US$ US$/m3 US$ US$/m3 US$ US$/m3 
Administration 130,038 16 10,552 10 31,758 24 
Pre-harvesting 78,324 10 2974 3 12,149 9 
Harvesting 85,637 11 8476 8 70,965 54 
Skidding 74,378 9 6044 6   
Transport 85,695 11 39067 37 34,813 26 
Certification     4585 3 
Association     2846 2 
Total 379,694 48 61,069 58 157,116 118 
m3 harvested 7843  1048  1326  
* cost in 2008 adjusted by the inflation rate between 2008 and 2010 (10%). 
The significant variations in the share of pre-harvesting costs, particularly between Coomflona and 
CANOR, were linked to the fact that, for Coomflona, they covered trail and log landing opening, 
inventorying, and the drafting and submitting of the annual harvesting plan. In the case of CANOR,  
the costs of inventorying and drafting and submitting the annual operational plan were fully covered by 
external funds. 
In all the cases, log transport cost (including loading the logs) represented a major share of the 
production costs; this share was largest in CANOR (64% of the total cost). The unit log transport cost 
ranged from US$11/m3 in Coomflona to US$37/m3 in CANOR. In CANOR and Porto Dias, log 
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transport and loading were contracted out at an average price of US$37/m3 and US$26/m3, 
respectively. In Coomflona, a loader and a truck were rented. The loader rental accounted for the 
largest share of log transport costs (US$10/m3) and the transport costs only covered transport of the 
logs to the log landing. 
Administration costs were substantial in Coomflona and Porto Dias because they covered the 
salaries of the team responsible for plans, all the procedures, paying taxes/fees, sales negotiations, and 
accounting, as well as the running costs of the building and equipment (trucks, chainsaws) belonging to 
the association and the cooperative. In CANOR, until 2009, the plan benefited from the support of an 
external team financed by an external project, but in practice only one person, the association 
president, was in charge of plan management. Even in the latter case, the administration cost was 
substantial, covering several trips to the state capital (Belém) made by the manager to formalize the plan 
and the association, as well as to pay the annual taxes/fees. 
In 2014, we were only able to obtain comparable data for production costs for the Porto Dias case 
study. The data show that the distribution of production costs was almost the same as in 2010 and that 
the total production cost per cubic meter had decreased slightly. 
One major cost, not included in Table 2, was the cost of drafting and submitting the management 
plan. Initial costs were mainly funded by the Promanejo program (CANOR, Virola Jatobá, Porto Dias, 
Chico Mendes) or by an external funding agency such as ITTO, in Coomflona. It was very difficult to 
obtain data on the cost of this initial stage. However, we did get a general idea of the cost in our 
interviews and from the data we collected for two of our case studies. CANOR received US$265,116 
from Promanejo in 2004 and about 50% of this amount (US$132,558) was used to pay for the 
delimitation and forest inventory of the 24 blocks (a prerequisite for preparation of a technical forest 
management plan) and the drawing up of the forest management plan and of the first operational plan 
by a forest engineer. The same level (US$136,364) was reported by the Virola-Jatobá Association. 
3.3. Benefits and Income 
Table 3 shows the total benefits for each plan, the annual benefits for each cubic meter harvested, 
and the annual benefits obtained per household, based on the assumption that the total benefits were 
distributed among all the households that belonged to the association holding the plan. As mentioned 
previously, each community itself decided to distribute all or part of the profits obtained or to invest in 
collective goods. Only CANOR and Porto Dias distributed all the total benefits among all the 
households holding the plan. 
In the end, all the plans made a net benefit, i.e., they succeeded in selling timber at a higher average 
unit price than the average unit production cost paid by the community. The lowest benefit per cubic 
meter was obtained by CANOR. In fact, the situation remained critical until the end of 2010 because 
the total volume of timber sold up to 2010 was only 551 m3 (gross sales: US$40,517) so the 
cooperative had a negative balance for some time. A survey carried out on behalf of SFB in 2011 
reported that the community finally succeeded in selling the remaining harvested timber [20]. The 
lowest net benefit per household was calculated for Virola-Jatobá. The yield of timber was lower than 
expected: instead of harvesting 8000 m3 from 500 ha, the enterprise in fact harvested only 4054 m3 of 
round timber because the timber potential had been overestimated in the previous forest inventory. 
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Some trees that had been marked for cutting were located in preservation areas and consequently could 
not be removed and more trees were hollow than estimated. 






Porto Dias  
2010 
Virola Jatobá  
2008 ** 
Chico Mendes  
2009 *** 
Total cost 379,694 61,069 157,116 27,014 108,713 
Sales 693,224 77,090 192,794 139,794 203,848 
Additional subsidy   17 811  53,095 
Net benefit 313,530 16,021 54,070 112,780 148,230 
Net benefit/Household 1742 2670 4506 616 3294 





Porto Dias  
2010 
Virola Jatobá  
2008 ** 
Chico Mendes  
2009 *** 
Total cost 48 58 118 7 23 
Sales 88 74 145 35 43 
Additional subsidy   14  11 
Net benefit 40 16 41 28 31 
* For Coomflona the volume harvested was higher than the volume sold. ** As for the production cost, all 
values for 2008 have been adjusted by the inflation rate between 2008 and 2010 (10%). *** All values for 
2009 have been adjusted by the inflation rate between 2009 and 2010 (5.9%). 
The highest net benefit per cubic meter harvested was calculated for Coomflona and Porto Dias, 
despite their relatively high production costs. The high sales prices they negotiated explain their 
positive results. Coomflona and Porto Dias succeeded in negotiating prices of US$122/m3 and 
US$145/m3 (including transport costs), respectively, whereas the sales price negotiated by CANOR 
was US$74/m3. Moreover, the Porto Dias and Chico Mendes settlements benefited from a significant 
additional subsidy from the state government of Acre. Coomflona benefits could have been even 
higher because they harvested 7843 m3 but only succeeded in selling 5704 m3 of round logs in 2008. 
We were able to collect more recent quantitative data for Porto Dias and Chico Mendes comparable 
with the data collected concerning 2009 and 2010. These data show that Cooperfloresta succeeded in 
guaranteeing an annual benefit for the families involved in the management plan that was almost the 
same as the amount they received in 2009 and 2010. 
Some additional income goes to households with members involved in administering the plan or in 
forest management operations, which was the case in some of the case studies in the state of Pará 
(Table 4). In the Chico Mendes and Porto Dias case studies, at that time, no community members were 
employed by the timber companies in charge of the harvesting phase, and the plan was exclusively 
administered by Cooperfloresta. For the other initiatives, Table 4 shows that the additional income was 
quite substantial for households with a member involved in administration or forest operations and 
often surpassed what might be expected from the distribution of net benefits made by the plan. 
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Table 4. Total income per household including salaries (US$). 
Characteristics 
Number of  
Households 
Net Benefit  
per Household 
Salary 
Total Income  
per Household 
Coomflona 
Households with a member involved  
in administration 
10 1742 3605 5347 
Households with a member involved in  
forest management 
42 1742 3000 4742 
Virola-Jatobá 
Households with a member who was  
a permanent employee of the timber company 
2 616 2895 3511 
Households with a member who was  
a temporary employee of the timber company 
10 616 3837 4453 
CANOR 
Households with a member involved  
in forest management 
4 2,670 469 3139 
4. Discussion 
Despite the fact that there has been significant improvement in legal community access to large 
areas of forest, particularly through the expansion of RESEX, PDS, and PAE, this does not necessarily 
ensure substantial additional income for the families. The Brazilian minimum salary in 2010 was 
US$297/month distributed over 13 months, or US$3861 annually. In our case studies (see Tables 3 and 4), 
only 74 households (over 426 households involved) could have gained an additional annual income 
higher than one minimum salary. It is not negligible but it is a relatively small amount when one 
considers that 80% of each household’s land cannot be converted to other uses. In the state of Pará, 
some authors showed that on a per-hectare basis, income from agriculture is often higher than income 
from harvesting timber [16,28]. Moreover, incomes from CFM are not always sustained each year.  
A look at the history of some of the case studies reveals several years without exploration following 
plan approval: four years for CANOR and Virola-Jatobá; three years for Porto Dias and Chico 
Mendes. The reasons are the difficulties involved in beginning forestry operations and market 
uncertainty. Sometimes it is not possible to reach an agreement on timber sales, in which case 
harvesting becomes very risky, especially when the community lacks the necessary capital to cover 
pre-harvesting and harvesting costs. 
Market conditions are still unfavorable for CFM projects that lack support for the marketing stage. 
Despite the federal government’s effort to fight illegal logging, local sawmills are still supplied by 
illegal sources. Timber from indigenous lands and settlement areas continue to supply many sawmills 
with or without the cooperation of the indigenous people and settlers, thereby pushing timber  
prices down. 
The case of CANOR is a good illustration of this situation. Several attempts were made to negotiate 
and sign a sales contract with various timber companies before harvesting, but not even an oral 
agreement was reached. The cooperative only succeeded in selling its timber after harvesting at a 
lower price than in the other case studies. The sales price was not lower because CANOR sold mainly 
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less-valuable species: 51% of the timber sold by CANOR was from the most valuable species, 
compared to 52% sold by Porto Dias. Intermediation by Cooperfloresta and the fact that the Porto Dias 
plan was certified by FSC clearly made a difference during sales negotiations. 
Reaching national or international markets remains a challenge for communities. The buyers in 
Brazil’s central (Brasilia) and southeastern (São Paulo) regions demand processed wood that is costly 
and risky to produce. They are very strict about timber quality and the communities are not equipped 
or prepared to produce high-quality processed timber. 
Even with strong support for marketing, it is often difficult to sell the entire harvest at a profit.  
The legal requirements of the forest management plan forbid harvesting the same parcel twice without 
waiting for the legal rotation period. Communities often prefer to harvest all species even if they have 
not yet found a buyer for some of them. Thus, significant quantities of timber may remain unsold, 
significantly reducing the final benefit, which was the case for Coomflona. Community–company 
partnerships may help reduce such risks, as timber companies are more skilled at processing logs and 
finding suitable markets for end products. However, a community member of the Virola-Jatobá 
Association claimed the company tried to harvest the most valuable species to the detriment of other 
species that the community was interested in selling. 
Securing market access at prices that make CFM plans financially viable may thus be the first step 
to increase the potential of CFM in the Amazon and allow for more efficient use of public funds.  
For example, when the local or regional governments need to buy timber to build schools, medical 
centers, public housing, and other projects, they could preferentially buy it from areas with CFM plans 
at guaranteed prices. The current procurement mechanisms do not allow this because the supplier who 
is chosen is usually the one offering the timber at the lowest price. In Brazil, a system of minimum 
guaranteed price already exists for smallholders’ agricultural products. Establishing an official list of 
minimum prices for timber from CFM projects may help CFM managers reduce speculation while 
negotiating with buyers. Public bidding systems, such as in Coomflona, could also provide a 
mechanism for improving market access. 
It is also important to improve the communities’ knowledge of the market value of timber stocks in 
their legal forest reserve areas. In general, supported by donors, each community manages to inventory 
the first parcel to be harvested. However, an extensive inventory of the entire forest reserve might 
avoid raising false expectations regarding potential benefits and prevent the community from investing 
in a plan with limited financial viability. A full forest inventory would enable settlers and communities 
to better plan future timber sales and would better guide logging operations. Moreover, markets need 
to be developed for the many less valuable species that are always difficult to sell, since the timber 
companies, who are the main direct buyers, are not interested in these species. 
Securing market access and value for timber from CFM is all the more necessary as not many 
options exist to reduce production costs. 
The initial costs (i.e., inventory, preparation of forest management plans and annual operational 
plans, starting the bureaucratic process of approval, and follow-up) are prohibitive for the 
communities. Although community members may be betrayed by unethical professionals who 
overcharge for their services, particularly once they know that public funds are available, it is also true 
that contracting the services needed to draw up a forest management plan in the Amazon region is 
expensive. There are few forestry engineers and technicians available and their fees are usually high. 
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In addition to having to pay for such services, the community members incur costs for travel to register 
documents in the state capital. For the elaboration and submission of the Virola-Jatobá plan, travel 
expenses amounted to US$9,800 and taxes/fees to US$10,900. Unfortunately, in Brazil, insufficient 
data exist on the cost of drawing up a forest management plan, even for private companies [29]. The 
smaller the volumes available for harvesting, the greater the weight of this fixed initial cost. 
Such initial costs could be reduced through a more efficient administrative system and the 
possibility of registering forest management plans without having to travel to the state capital. As this 
stage is systematically financed by public funds, a public institution or an organization directly paid by 
a public institution could be entirely in charge of drafting and submitting CFM plans. For example, in 
Acre, the state government implemented a bidding system to contract forestry services to draw up, 
submit, and monitor CFM plans. 
In some cases of community–company partnerships, the timber company supports the cost of 
formalizing the forest management plan. However, such cases can be expected to remain limited to 
communities with large forest reserves or, as in some cases, when the timber company plans to obtain 
legal access to the timber for the first harvest without being responsible for post-silvicultural 
treatments [20]. In any case, this alternative is now more difficult because of Normative Instruction 
No. 5 from the Ministry of Agrarian Development. 
Pre-harvesting and harvesting costs are substantial and there is little room to reduce such costs,  
except perhaps by investing in skidding equipment. Santos Melo et al. (2011) estimated that 
Coomflona could decrease skidding costs by 30% by investing in a skidder, which would also provide 
more flexibility for this stage and could be rented out to other communities [30]. 
The poor condition of internal settlement roads and external roads increases transport costs. The 
case of CANOR is critical, but the situation may be the same for all smallholders with separate plots 
willing to invest in CFM. Improving roads may help but will not substantially reduce the cost of 
transport in the short term, because the major share of these costs is renting transport and  
loading equipment. 
Just after 2010, all initiatives (except CANOR) succeeded in renewing their forest operations, 
highlighting the importance of internal organization schemes (such as Coomflona and Cooperfloresta) 
and/or partnerships with a private timber company, even though this may appear somewhat costlier in 
the short term. Having a full team dedicated to management and operational planning from one year to 
another makes the difference because annual operational plans, harvest planning, sales negotiations, 
payment of taxes, contracting services, etc. are difficult for one person to manage. Institutional 
organization also makes the difference: in the state of Para, almost all CFM activities stopped in 2012 
because local institutions did not succeed in performing the CFM plan assessment required by the new 
Normative Instructions in time. This was not the case in the state of Acre. 
5. Conclusions 
Community forest management for timber production could be financially viable in the Brazilian 
Amazon with significant public financial support and/or partnerships with private companies. 
However, the annual cash income a smallholder can expect from 80% of his land area is not sufficient 
to sustain the family’s livelihood. Improving smallholders’ incomes from their landholdings—while 
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preserving the forest—requires investment in research and development to support the implementation 
of sustainable cattle ranching and agricultural activities in the limited area allowed to be deforested or 
to find a way to increase SFM profitability. Many other benefits may be obtained from SFM  
(e.g., creation of employment, income diversification, environmental amenities), but these were not the 
focus of this study. A major barrier threatening financial viability is insecure market access and poorly 
remunerative timber prices. Once this barrier is overcome, even with high and incompressible 
production costs, CFM can succeed in producing net benefits. Today, however, many communities are 
not in this situation. As it exists for some agricultural products produced by smallholders, a public policy 
guaranteeing minimum remunerative prices for timber from CFM should be a priority to reduce the 
risk of failure. Moreover, a better assessment of timber potential in smallholdings is required through 
systematic inventory, given the large initial fixed cost of drawing up, submitting, and starting a CFM. 
Finally, the current legal framework could be simplified and should keep a certain level of flexibility to 
enhance smallholder investment in SFM for timber production. 
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